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AT MEMPHIS 
James Green, 
Employee, 
v. 
Kellogg Companies, 
Employer, 
And 
Corvel Ins. Co., 
Insurance Carrier. 
) Docket No.: 2015-08-0568 
) 
) State File No.: 6779-2015 
) 
) Judge Robert Durham 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER 
Tinu~ 9:40AM 
This Compensation Hearing came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation 
Judge on January 11, 2017, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 
(2016). The dispositive issue is whether Mr. Green sustained an injury to his right 
shoulder on November 14, 2014, that arose primarily out of and in the course and scope 
of his employment with Kellogg. If so, secondary issues include to what extent he is 
entitled to past and future medical benefits, temporary disability benefits, and permanent 
partial disability benefits for this injury. 
The Court holds Mr. Green did not establish by a preponderance of evidence that 
he sustained injuries that arose primarily out of and in the course of his employment on 
November 14, 2014. 
Stipulations 
At the hearing, the parties agreed to the following stipulations: 
1. Mr. Green's alleged date of injury was November 14, 2014, and he 
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provided notice to Kellogg of his alleged injury on that day. 
2. Mr. Green's compensation rate is $932.80 for temporary disability benefits 
and $848.00 for permanent partial disability benefits. 
3. If Mr. Green's shoulder replacement is compensable, he would be entitled 
to temporary total disability benefits from September 15, 2015, until December 27, 2015. 
4. If Mr. Green's shoulder replacement is compensable, his date of maximum 
medical improvement would be December 27, 2015. 
5. Mr. Green's medical expenses for treatment of his right-shoulder injury that 
were not paid by Kellogg total $56,057.13. 
6. The designated medical expense records and the designated medical records 
jointly submitted by the parties and presented as Collective Exhibits Three and Four are 
admissible as evidence for consideration by the Court. 
History of Claim 
Mr. Green, fifty-eight, has made waffles for Kellogg for twenty-eight years, first 
as an "iron adjuster" and then, for the last seventeen years, as a "wheel technician." Mr. 
Green's job requires him to oversee a "wheel" of over one hundred waffle irons. He has 
to regulate the batter and heat, replace any irons that are working improperly, perform 
quality inspections, and periodically add "bits," i.e. small pieces of cinnamon or dried 
fruit, such as blueberries and strawberries, to the batter. To add bits, Mr. Green must use 
a pallet jack to bring in pallets holding boxes of bits weighing several hundred pounds to 
his station. He then must reach into the box and scoop the bits out with a bucket. After 
filling the bucket, he lifts it out of the box and carries it up several steps where he dumps 
it into a hopper that mixes the bits into the batter. 
Mr. Green testified that on November 14, 2014, he attempted to scoop bits from a 
box when he felt sudden and intense pain in his right shoulder. He averred that, while he 
suffered from aches and pains in his shoulder before, he had never experienced this type 
of pain and had never missed work or sought treatment for right-shoulder pain before 
November 14. Kellogg offered no evidence to the contrary. 
Mr. Green testified that immediately after the incident, he reported it to his 
supervisors, Jason Jackson and Bill Nabors. They sent him to see the company nurse, 
Pam Ewing. Mr. Green completed an accident report, and Ms. Ewing gave him some 
over-the-counter pain medication. Mr. Green then returned to work and finished his shift. 
The next day, Mr. Green started work as usual, but he testified his right-shoulder 
2 
pain became so intense that he again sought Ms. Ewing's assistance. She gave him some 
aspirin, and he returned to his job. Mr. Green stated this went on for several weeks; he 
would daily communicate with Ms. Ewing about his shoulder pain, but continued to work 
full-duty, although with great difficulty and often requiring assistance from co-workers. 
Mr. Green testified that on January 21, 2015, he insisted Ms. Ewing provide him 
with a doctor to treat his shoulder as soon as possible. Ms. Ewing provided a panel of 
physicians and informed him that Dr. Lloyd Robinson could see him quickly, but that an 
appointment with one of the other doctors would result in some delay. Mr. Green chose 
Dr. Robinson and signed the panel accordingly. 
Mr. Green saw Dr. Robinson, a family practitioner, the next day. (Ex. 2 at 6.) In 
the medical history forms, Mr. Green stated the injury occurred two months earlier and he 
had never had a similar injury in the past. (Ex. 2 at 45.) In his records, Dr. Robinson 
noted Mr. Green complained of "acute pain" in his right shoulder after lifting buckets at 
work. (Ex. 2 at 48.) 
In his deposition, Dr. Robinson testified Mr. Green did not advise him of a 
specific work injury occurring on November 14, but stated he suffered worsening right-
shoulder pain after lifting buckets at work. Dr. Robinson ordered x-rays and noted 
arthritic damage to Mr. Green's right shoulder. (Ex. 2 at 7.) He diagnosed Mr. Green 
with a shoulder strain, placed him under restrictions, and ordered physical therapy, which 
Carvel, Kellogg's workers' compensation administrator, never approved. (Ex. 2 at 8.) 
Mr. Green did undergo an initial evaluation for physical therapy and, according to the 
note, informed the therapist that he first noticed pain in his right shoulder when "reaching 
to scoop a heavy scoopful of brown sugar at Kellogg's. He felt a 'pop' in his shoulder 
and immediately felt an intense bum that radiated into proximal arm." (Ex. 2 at 68.) 
Dr. Robinson eventually ordered an MRI that showed extensive arthritic damage 
in Mr. Green's right shoulder, but there was no rotator cuff tear or evidence of an acute 
injury. (Ex. 2 at 9-11.) At that time, Dr. Robinson opined Mr. Green's underlying 
arthritis was the primary cause of his symptoms and that it was not a work-related 
condition. (Ex. 2 at 27.) Dr. Robinson then released Mr. Green to seek treatment with 
his primary care physician. (Ex. 2 at 11.) In his deposition, Dr. Robinson continued to 
opine that Mr. Green's employment contributed less than 50% to his pain complaints and 
that the underlying pre-existing arthritis was the primary cause of his symptoms. (Ex. 2 
at 13-14.) 
Mr. Green testified he did not feel Dr. Robinson would provide any substantive 
treatment for his shoulder; therefore, he saw his family practitioner, Dr. Lee McCallum, 
about a week after he began seeing Dr. Robinson. Dr. McCallum noted Mr. Green stated 
the pain began a week earlier when he was "picking up a pail and heard a pop." (Ex. 4 at 
51.) Dr. McCallum eventually referred Mr. Green to Dr. Kenneth Weiss, an orthopedist, 
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for specialized treatment. At the time of his referral, Dr. McCallum diagnosed Mr. Green 
with a "repetitive motion injury" and stated it "seems to be work-related to me." (Ex. 4 
at 42.) 
At Mr. Green's initi_al visit, Dr. Weiss noted that Mr. Green stated he had a "long 
history" of shoulder pain, claiming, "it has been hurting through the years." (Ex. 2 at 94.) 
After attempting conservative care, Dr. Weiss eventually performed a right-shoulder 
replacement on September 14, 2015. He subsequently wrote a letter opining the 
following: 
Mr. Green is a patient of mine. We have been treating him for his right 
shoulder pain with glenohumeral arthrosis. We do feel that the diagnosis 
from which we are treating him is compatible with his duties that he was 
performing while at Kellogg. We do feel that the shoulder issues and his 
glenohumeral arthrosis, which required surgery, is consistent with or at 
least exacerbated by his repetitive pushing, pulling and lifting the arm while 
at work. 
(Ex. 2 at 72.) 
Mr. Green worked full-duty at full pay until his surgery. After surgery, he 
remained off work until December 27, 2015, and then returned to full-duty with no 
restrictions. Mr. Green testified he continues to work at Kellogg as a wheel technician 
with no restrictions, albeit with some difficulty. He lacks full range of motion in his 
shoulder and frequently experiences pain as well as numbness and tingling in his right 
shoulder and arm. 
Mr. Green entered the C-32 Medical Report of Samuel Chung, D.O. into 
evidence. (Ex. 1.) In the C-32, Dr. Chung, an osteopath, opined Mr. Green did not suffer 
any temporary total disability as a result of his right-shoulder condition, although the 
parties stipulated that the "dates temporary total unpaid" was from September 15, 2015, 
through December 27, 2015. (Ex. 1 at 5 and T.R. 1.) Dr. Chung also opined that Mr. 
Green reached maximum medical improvement on December 1, 2015, although the 
parties stipulated the "date of maximum recovery or return to work" from Dr. Weiss' 
surgery was December 27, 2015. On the form, Dr. Chung marked that Mr. Green's 
injury "more probably than not" arose from his work; however, an unsigned addendum to 
the C-32 does have an "X" next to "yes" to the question as to whether the employee's 
injury "arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment." In addition, 
the form has an "X" next to "yes" to the following question: 
What is your opinion as to whether the employee's death, disablement or 
the and whether Mr. Green's "disablement or the need for medical 
treatment is shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it 
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contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the death, disablement 
or the need for medical treatment, considering all causes. 
(Ex. 1 at 11.) Dr. Chung did not place any specific weight restrictions on Mr. Green's 
right-shoulder use but did recommend he limit climbing, balancing, and working 
overhead or away from his body. (Ex. l at 9.) He opined Mr. Green sustained a 14% 
impairment to the body as a whole pursuant to the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, as a result 
ofhis right-shoulder injury. (Ex. 1 at 5.) 
Mr. Green testified that, following Corvel's denial, he repeatedly asked Ms. Ewing 
for additional care through workers' compensation, but she told him she could not help 
him given Corvel's denial. Kellogg did not offer any witnesses to counter Mr. Green's 
assertions regarding his interactions with his managers or Ms. Ewing. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
The Court considers the following legal principles in reaching its conclusions in 
this matter. The Court must interpret the Workers' Compensation Law fairly, impartially 
and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the 
employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2016). Mr. Green has the burden 
of proof on all essential elements of his workers' compensation claim, including 
causation. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015). 
In order to establish causation, an employee must prove "to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that [the injury] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing 
the death, disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes." Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C) (2016). The term "reasonable degree of medical certainty" 
means that, "in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering all 
causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D) 
(2016). Thus, causation must be established by expert medical testimony, and it must be 
more than "speculation or possibility" on the part of the doctor. !d. 
In this matter, both Mr. Green and Kellogg offered medical testimony. When 
weighing expert testimony, the law provides the causation opinion of a physician selected 
from a panel "pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3)" is presumed correct, but may be rebutted by 
the preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E) (2016). 
Therefore, the Court must first determine whether Dr. Robinson's opinion must be 
presumed correct regarding causation. 
The parties do not dispute that Mr. Green selected Dr. Robinson's name on 
January 24, 2015, from a panel provided to him by Kellogg, nor does Mr. Green dispute 
that the panel met the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3) 
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(20 16). However, he did assert that it took repeated requests over a period of more than 
two months for Kellogg to provide the panel, and when it did, Ms. Ewing directed him 
toward Dr. Robinson. 
The Court agrees that waiting more than two months to provide a panel after an 
injury is reported is improper; however, the fact remains that Kellogg did eventually 
provide one that complied with the law. As to his assertion that Ms. Ewing "directed" 
him to Dr. Robinson, Mr. Green testified he demanded to see a doctor as soon as possible 
and Ms. Ewing told him Dr. Robinson was available right away, but it would take some 
time to get an appointment with the other physicians on the panel. Mr. Green offered no 
evidence disputing Ms. Ewing's assertion, and the fact that he obtained an appointment 
with Dr. Robinson the following day tends to corroborate her statement. He also offered 
no evidence that he would not have been allowed to choose one of the other physicians 
had he decided to do so. Thus, the Court finds Mr. Green chose Dr. Robinson from a 
proper panel and further holds that Dr. Robinson's opinion is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2016). 
In his deposition, Dr. Robinson opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
that Mr. Green's shoulder pain was primarily caused by his underlying, pre-existing 
arthritis, which was not a work-related condition. In order to prevail, Mr. Green must 
rebut this opinion by a preponderance of the evidence. When weighing the evidence 
offered by Mr. Green against Dr. Robinson's testimony, the Court finds Mr. Green failed 
to meet this burden. 
Mr. Green offered the C-32 of Dr. Chung in an attempt to rebut Dr, Robinson's 
testimony. "In evaluating expert medical opinions, a trial judge may consider, among 
other things, the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their evaluation, the 
information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information 
by other experts." Venable v. Superior Essex, Inc., No. 2015-05-0582, 2016 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 56, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 2, 2016). "A 
trial judge has the discretion to conclude that the opinion of one expert should be 
accepted over that of another expert." Sanker v. Nacarato Trucks, Inc., No. 2016-06-
0101,2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *11-12 (citation omitted). The Court 
finds Dr. Robinson's opinion more persuasive for several reasons. 
First, Dr. Chung's testimony is offered through a C-32 written medical report as 
opposed to a deposition. While a C-32 is certainly admissible, it is often less effective 
than a deposition given that the evidence contained within is not subject to explanation or 
cross-examination. Second, Dr. Chung is an osteopath, which requires less training and 
education than a medical doctor, as illustrated by Dr. Chung's CV attached to the C-32. 
Again, while an osteopath is qualified by law to testify as to causation, the Court finds 
Dr. Robinson's training and education to be more persuasive in this instance. 
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Finally, the C-32 completed by Dr. Chung contained numerous errors that did little 
to create confidence in its reliability. It indicated Mr. Green did not suffer any temporary 
total disability even though it is undisputed he was off work for three months following 
surgery. It also stated he reached maximum medical improvement on December 1, 2015, 
although there is no indication as to how Dr. Chung arrived at this date when the parties 
agreed Mr. Green returned to work on December 28. Finally, the C-32 contained the 
causation standard that applied to injuries prior to July 1, 2014, and has no application to 
Mr. Green's injury. In fact, due to this error, the C-32 fails to rebut Dr. Robinson's 
opinion at all unless the document attached to the back of the C-32, which does state the 
correct causation standard, is considered an addendum to the report. However, while it 
may have been intended as an addendum, the document is unsigned. There is also no 
reference in the C-32 to the document or the opinions contained within it. Furthermore, 
the second question on the form, regarding "the employee's death, disablement or need 
for treatment," makes little sense when read in its entirety. Given the factors stated 
above, the Court cannot find Dr. Chung's C-32 is sufficient to overcome Dr. Robinson's 
opinion regarding causation. 1 
Of course, Dr. Chung's C-32 is not the only evidence offered by Mr. Robinson 
regarding causation. He also testified that he experienced intense pain in his right 
shoulder while using a bucket to scoop out "bits," and he had never experienced such 
symptoms before. While lay testimony cannot, in and of itself, serve to establish 
causation, it can certainly corroborate the testimony provided by experts. However, in 
this instance, while the Court has no reason to doubt Mr. Robinson's testimony that the 
November 14, 2014 event exacerbated his condition, he also testified he suffered from 
"aches and pains" in his shoulder before this event. The records of Dr. McCallum and 
Dr. Weiss, who both recorded that Mr. Robinson told them he had suffered from shoulder 
pain for years, corroborated this testimony. Furthermore, while Dr. McCallum and Dr. 
Weiss indicated in their records that it "seemed" Mr. Robinson's shoulder complaints 
were work-related, and his condition was consistent with his employment at Kellogg, 
neither opined that Mr. Robinson's right-shoulder condition arose primarily out of and in 
the course and scope of the work incident on November 14, 2014. See Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 50-6-012(14)(A) (2016). As a result, the Court finds the additional evidence offered by 
Mr. Green, in conjunction with Dr. Chung's C-32, is still insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of correctness afforded Dr. Robinson's causation opinion. 
Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Green failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he sustained an injury that primarily arose out of and in the course and 
scope of his employment on November 14, 2014 with Kellogg. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 
50-6-102(14) (2016). Given the above finding, it is unnecessary to address other issues 
raised by the parties. 
1 The Court would note that, unfortunately, neither party decided to obtain the testimony of Dr. Weiss, who would 
most likely have the most credible opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Green's shoulder condition and the need for 
shoulder-replacement surgery. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Mr. Green's claim for workers' compensation benefits is denied. 
2. This Compensation Order constitutes a final adjudication upon the merits of Mr. 
Green's claim . . 
3. The $150.00 filing fee for this this cause is taxed to Kellogg, pursuant to Rule 
0800-02-21-.07 (2015) of the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations. 
4. Kellogg shall prepare and file a Statistical Data Form within ten business days of 
the date of entry of this Order. 
ENTERED THIS THE /~ TH DAY OF January, 2017. 
~-a-m_,_J_u_~_g_e ____________ _ 
Court of Workers' Compensation Claims 
APPENDIX 
Exhibits: 
1. Form C-32 of Dr. Samuel Chung with attachments 
2. Deposition of Dr. Lloyd Robinson with attachments 
3. Designated Medical Bills 
4. Designated Medical Records 
5. Form C-42 
Technical Record: 
1. Notice of Stipulations for Trial 
2. Notice of Disputed Issues for Trial 
3. Employer's Pre-Hearing Statement 
4. Employee's Pre-Hearing Statement 
5. Order Denying Motion to Compel Discovery 
6. Employer's Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery 
7. Motion to Compel Discovery 
8. Dispute Certification Notice 
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19th
9. Initial Hearing Order 
10. Employee's Witness List 
11. Amended Employee's Lay Witness List 
12. Employer's Expert Witness List 
13. Employer's Lay Witness List 
14. Transfer Order 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order 
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the _ 
day of January, 2017. 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Shannon T oon 
Thomas J. Smith 
Via Via Service sent to: 
Fax Email 
X stoon@taylortoon.com 
X tsmith@spicerfirm.com 
rum, Clerk of Court 
Court Workers' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
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